St. John's Law Review
Volume 62
Number 4 Volume 62, Summer 1988, Number 4

Article 2

The Appeal of the Grant of a New Trial in Federal Court
Roger M. Baron

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

THE APPEAL OF THE GRANT OF A NEW
TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT
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INTRODUCTION

As a general proposition, appellate review of the grant of a
new trial by a federal district court is possible only upon the rendition of a final judgment in the newly granted trial. This rule is
encapsulated in the phrase "reviewable but not appealable." In a
limited number of situations, however, immediate appeal may be
obtained. This Article reviews the law that has developed in the
federal court system concerning the circumstances under which
such review is attainable.'
II. THE

GENERAL RULE: REVIEWABLE BUT NOT APPEALABLE

The general appeals statute, section 1291 of title 28 of the
United States Code, limits authorization of review by the federal
courts of appeals to "all final decisions of the district courts."' The
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.S., J.D., University of
Missouri at Columbia. The author wishes to thank Sarah Baron, Jeannette Schwerbel, and
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1 Initially, it should be noted that the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is a
procedural matter governed exclusively by federal law, regardless of whether the underlying
claim is a federal or state law cause of action. See Wiedemann v. Galiano, 722 F.2d 335, 337
(7th Cir. 1983); Silverii v. Kramer, 314 F.2d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 1963).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The statute reads in full:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295
of this title.
Id.; see 11 C. WRIGHr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2818, at 114
(1973).
The grant of a new trial limited solely to the issue of damages is generally treated identically to the grant of a new trial on all issues. In each case, the grant is reviewable only on
appeal from a final judgment following the second trial. See Dassinger v. South Cent. Bell
Tel. Co., 537 F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Supreme Court has defined a final decision as one that "'ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.' "3 When a new trial is granted after a jury
verdict, the action remains pending in the trial court with the parties relegated to the positions they occupied prior to the first trial.
Consequently, such a grant is not a final order and hence is not
appealable under section 1291. Instead, the grant of a new trial is
considered an unappealable "interlocutory order."4
Although not appealable, the grant of a new trial may ultimately be reviewable by the appellate court following the entry of
a final judgment in the second trial,5 or in whatever subsequent
retrial culminates in a final judgment.' The prohibition against an
immediate appeal is predicated upon a policy against appellate intrusion on a piecemeal basis. Ideally, it is believed, the federal appellate courts should be able to review in one sitting all stages of a
proceeding. 7 The general rule that the grant of a new trial is not
3 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1136 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
4 Roy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 781 F.2d 670, 671 (9th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam).
I See Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981); see also 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2818, at 115. An initial verdict winner, after losing
a second trial, may appeal from a final judgment based thereon-without challenging any
aspect of the second trial-for the sole purpose of contesting the propriety of the action of
the district court in granting the new trial. See, e.g., Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d
1554, 1555 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (appellant only challenged order granting new trial after
verdict in new trial); Evers, 650 F.2d at 796 (appellant awaited entry of final judgment in
second trial before appealing order granting second trial).
6 See Dassinger, 537 F.2d at 1346.
' See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). In Cobbledick, Justice
Frankfurter outlined the rationale for the federal appeals policy:
Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruction to just claims
that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its
initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration must not
be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate reviews
of the component elements in a unified cause.
Id.; see also J. FRIENDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.1, at 581 (1985)
(rationale behind final judgment rule is based on "a desire to achieve judicial economy and
efficiency").
With respect to the prospect of securing appellate review, the treatment afforded the
grant of a new trial is consistent with the treatment afforded the denial of a new trial. The
denial of a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) is not, in and
of itself, appealable because it merely restates an attack on the merits of the challenged
judgment. Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 1986). It is the accompanying
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immediately appealable places the initial verdict winner in an
anomalous position. Such a party may certainly be aggrieved by
the grant of a new trial, yet he or she is required to lose that trial,'
or at least suffer a less favorable result,9 in order to seek appellate
review of the decision which forced him or her to undergo the second trial. In denying review in the event the initial verdict winner
again prevails in the new trial, it is said that he has suffered only
the mere inconvenience of undergoing a second trial."0
III.

STANDARD OF

REvIEw

Parties aggrieved by the grant of a new trial, in many instances, ultimately do receive appellate review. Frequently, however, their plea for relief is overshadowed by the subsequent retrial
and the oft-quoted principle that the grant of a new trial is within
the broad discretion of the trial court. 1 There is great reluctance
on the part of the appellate courts to interfere with a trial court's
decision to grant a new trial. While the decision has been described
as subject to an abuse of discretion standard, 2 this language probably understates the broad discretion actually afforded the trial
judgment that would constitute the basis for an appeal, at which time the denial of a motion
for a new trial may be reviewed. See Peters Township School Dist. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir. 1987).
1 See, e.g., Hewitt, 732 F.2d at 1555 (appellant appealed granting of new trial after
receiving adverse judgment in second trial).
' See, e.g., Narcisse v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 620 F.2d 544, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1980)
(injured appellant appealed granting of new trial after damages awarded were reduced at
conclusion of new trial).
10 Cf. Gallimore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 635 F.2d 1165, 1171 n.9 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb.
1981) (lamenting waste of private and judicial resources in new trial). In reference to "the
waste of private and judicial resources" necessary to a second trial, the appellate court in
Gallimore observed: "This is simply part of the penalty exacted of our system of justice by
the rule that in the ordinary course of events, an order granting a new trial is interlocutory
and not subject to immediate appeal." Id.
" See, e.g., Sellers v. Baisier, 792 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1986) ("trial court has broad
discretion in ruling on motions for a new trial"); Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 748 F.2d 287,
290 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (trial court has "wide" discretion in granting new trial).
If the second trial is totally free from prejudicial error, then the appealing party is
in the awkward position of seeking to overturn what appears as a fair verdict simply because the second trial was not necessary since the first trial also was free
from prejudicial error. Thus, in most cases even if it were error to grant a new
trial, that error will be deemed harmless or moot by the time appellate review
occurs.
J. FRIENDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MiLLER, supra note 7, § 12.4, at 558-59.
22 See Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981); Massey v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975).

[Vol. 62:617

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

judge."3
Against this background, it may come as a surprise to learn
that there have actually been instances in which the initial verdict
winner has obtained relief subsequent to an adverse result in the
new trial. Indeed, there have been cases where the appellate court
has reinstated the first jury's verdict despite the fact that a second
jury has decided the case differently.1 4 Although earlier cases
which reinstated initial verdicts did not rest on constitutional
grounds, 5 recent cases 6 have sounded of the pertinent command
of the seventh amendment that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States."' 7 By
these words, the seventh amendment "'expresses in clear terms
the principle that facts once found by a jury in... a civil trial are
not to be reweighed and a new trial granted lightly.' " 8 The constitutional argument is most appealing in those cases where the district court has granted a new trial because the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. 9
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL

RULE

There are a number of exceptions to the general rule that the
grant of a new trial is not subject to immediate appellate review.
A.

Certified Interlocutory Appeals
Although the grant of a new trial is not appealable as a final

See Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1984); Narcisse
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 620 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1980); Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49,
55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967).
15 See, e.g., Duncan, 377 F.2d at 55 (court reversed on ground that trial judge abused
discretion).
16 See, e.g., Evers, 650 F.2d at 796 (noting that seventh amendment protects against
improper intrusion on jury's function).
'

14

17

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

18 Narcisse, 620 F.2d at 546 (quoting Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612,
620 (5th Cir. 1976)).
19See Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984) ("When a new
trial is granted on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence our review
is particularly stringent to protect the litigant's right to a jury trial."); Evers v. Equifax,
Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 796-97 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) ("the greatest degree of scrutiny is
exercised when a new trial is granted on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence").
Clearly, when the grant of a new trial is for reasons unrelated to the evidence, the
constitutional concern of the seventh amendment is not nearly as significant. See Anderson
v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 689 n.15 (11th Cir. 1985).
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judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it may be appealable as a
certified interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 1292(b). An appeal of this nature requires the cooperation of both the trial and
appellate courts. The trial court must certify in writing that its
order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. '2' Then, within ten days after the entry of
the certification order, an application for appeal may be made to
the court of appeals, which has full discretionary power to accept
or reject it. 21 The Supreme Court has held that noncompliance
with the precise requirements and time limit of the statute cannot
be cured by agreement of the parties or by the indulgence of the
court of appeals,2 2 even though the matter otherwise may warrant
certification.23 However, where the statute has been followed, and
both the trial and appellate courts have cooperated, immediate review by a certified interlocutory appeal has been used successfully
to reverse the grant of a new trial and reinstate the original verdict.2 This result is in accordance with the underlying rationale of
section 1292(b), which was passed as a consequence "of dissatisfaction with the prolongation of litigation and with harm to litigants
uncorrectable on appeal from a final judgment which sometimes
resulted from strict application of the federal final judgment
rule."2 5
B.

Mandamus

The remedy of mandamus may provide an alternative method
of seeking immediate appellate review of the grant of a new trial.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Allied Chemical Corp.
v. Daiflon, Inc.28 illustrates that its usage is limited at best. In
20 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
21 Id. Even where the trial court agrees to certify the question, there is no requirement
that the court of appeals allow the interlocutory appeal. See Gallimore v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 635 F.2d 1165, 1168 & n.4 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
22 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1976).
23 See id. at 745.
24 See Tikalsky v. City of Chicago, 687 F.2d 175, 178 (7th Cr. 1982).
25 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 753 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419

U.S. 885 (1974).
26 449 U.S. 33 (1980) (per curiam). In Daiflon, the court of appeals had utilized mandamus to correct what it perceived as the district court's interference with the plaintiff's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. See Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d 1249, 1260
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Daiflon, the Supreme Court held that the "trial court's ordering of
a new trial rarely, if ever, will justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus," since such a usage of mandamus would "undermine[] the
policy against piecemeal appellate review. '27 According to the
Daiflon court, a writ of mandamus should issue only in "exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of
power."2 8
As a result of Daiflon, the federal circuit courts have been less
inclined to utilize mandamus to provide for immediate review of
grants of new trials by district courts.2 9 Nevertheless, in an appropriate case, where the trial court's action is "blatantly wrong,"
mandamus may issue.30
C.

JurisdictionalDefects

If a district court should attempt to grant a new trial at a time
when it has no jurisdiction to do so, it has been held that a direct
appeal to the court of appeals will lie. 1 There is also some authority that mandamus is appropriate to secure immediate review of
the trial court's attempt to act at times when it lacks power to do
so. 3 2 This exception
to the general rule has been described as a
"narrow" one 33 and the appellate courts do not appear willing to
expand the exception beyond jurisdictional defects which are
34
based on untimeliness.
(10th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court reversed and held that the remedy of mandamus was
not available. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 37 (1980).
2 Daiflon, 449 U.S. at
36.
28 Id. at 35.
219See, e.g., Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990, 1002 (10th Cir. 1981) (writ not issued because plaintiffs failed to show they lacked other adequate means to relief and that they had
clear and indisputable right to issuance), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982).
11 See Central Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (8th
Cir. 1982) (after two trials, mandamus review of new trial order proper when grounds for
review "[did] not turn on a [new] trial court's proximity to the proceedings"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1204 (1983).
21 See Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1975).
2 See Peterman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 88, 89 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974). However, it should be noted that Peterman was decided prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Daifon.
33 See Herold v. Burlington N., Inc., 761 F.2d 1241, 1249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 888 (1985).
See id.; see also Eaton v. National Steel Prods. Co., 624 F.2d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (court unwilling to consider lack of jurisdiction exception where motion for
new trial timely filed).
14
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D. Remittitur
In a remittitur situation, the plaintiffs5 is given the choice of
either accepting a lesser amount of damages than that awarded by
the jury or being subject to the grant of a new trial.3" A plaintiff
who accepts the remittitur consents to a reduced judgment and
thereby effectuates a settlement which eliminates any right of appeal.37 On the other hand, if the plaintiff rejects the remittitur, he
is subjected to a new trial and the accompanying general rule that
a grant of a new trial is not appealable."'
During the 1960's and 1970's a line of cases developed, primarily in the Fifth Circuit, 39 which served to ameliorate the harshness
of this rule. It was recognized that plaintiffs may reluctantly accept
a remittitur because of fear that a second trial could result in a
smaller award. 0 The remoteness of appellate review did not seem
to afford the plaintiff a true choice. 4 ' Under the view adopted by
the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff could accept a remittitur "under protest" and then challenge the correctness of the remittitur order on
a direct appeal."2
The propriety of accepting remittiturs "under protest" for the
purpose of taking a direct appeal was addressed and rejected by
the Supreme Court in the 1977 decision, Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co.43 In Donovan, the court of appeals had dismissed the
plaintiff's appeal of a remittitur accepted under protest.4 The Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam opinion, reestablishing a line
of precedent stretching back to 1889 holding that a plaintiff cannot
"protest" and appeal a remittitur order to which he has agreed.
Cases decided subsequent to Donovan continue to recognize
35 Or the defendant in the case of a counterclaim.
36 See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2815, at 100.
'7 See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977); Evans v. Calmar S.S.
Co., 534 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1976); Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519

F.2d 531, 533 (2d Cir. 1975).
See Seltzner v. RDK Corp., 756 F.2d 51, 52 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
For a listing of this line of cases, see Donovan, 429 U.S. at 649.
40 See Recent Developments, Civil Procedure-Second Circuit Examines Appealabil-

ity of Remittitur, 44

FORDHAM L. REv. 845, 851 (1976).
41 See id. at 851-52.
42 See United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1970).
13

429 U.S. 648 (1977) (per curiam).

44 See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S.

648 (1977).
"I See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 649-50.
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that acceptance of a remittitur bars an appeal; 46 however, relief
from an improper remittitur was granted on a direct appeal on one
occasion when "the trial court lacked the power to order a remittitur based on post-trial occurrences. '47 On another occasion, mandamus relief was granted so as to thwart the trial court's attempt
to require yet a third trial contingent upon the denial of a remittitur as to damages assessed in the second trial.4 8
E.

Collateral Order Doctrine

Another means by which immediate review of the grant of a
new trial may be obtained is through the "collateral order" doctrine. Under this doctrine, if a decision can be characterized as one
falling within "that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated," then the decision
9 is appealable as a final decision under section 1291 of title
28.4
In Stevens v. Corbell,50 the Fifth Circuit reviewed an order of
a district court granting plaintiff a new trial in a section 1983 suit
against a number of police officers after the jury had returned a
verdict in favor of the officers.5 1 The Fifth Circuit, relying on the
collateral order doctrine, granted immediate review, noting that
the "freedom from the burdens of standing trial" might have been
part of the qualified immunity claimed by the defendant police officers.2 In allowing immediate review, the Fifth Circuit cited the
1985 Supreme Court decision, Mitchell v. Forsyth,53 which allowed
a direct appeal from the denial of a summary judgment motion
" See, e.g., Baltezore v. Concordia Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 767 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir.
1985) (remittitur, though accepted under protest, not subject to appeal), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1065 (1986); Higgins v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 716 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1983) (acceptance
of remittitur is final and unappealable).
47 O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1448 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).
48 See Central Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1211-12 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983).
"8Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
do 832 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2018 (1988).
51 Id. at 885.
'2 Id. at 887.
472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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brought on the basis of a similar qualified immunity defense. Such
application of the collateral order doctrine is rare, however, in
cases when, as in Stevens, the party already has been required to
participate in one trial. It would seem that the doctrine would be
more applicable in connection with pretrial dispositions such as actually existed in Mitchell. In other words, if a party has the right
not to stand trial, it would appear that such right should in all
likelihood be asserted, subject to immediate appellate review under
the collateral order doctrine, prior to the first trial.
F. The Conditional Grant of a New Trial
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(c)(1) imposes upon a district court an obligation to rule on an alternative motion for a new
trial when the district court decides to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("judgment n.o.v.").5 4 The ruling
is a conditional one because a new trial will be granted only if the
judgment n.o.v. is subsequently vacated or reversed by the appellate court. 55 In the event the initial verdict winner elects to challenge the granting of the judgment n.o.v., the conditional grant of a
new trial is also immediately reviewable. Hence, if the court of appeals finds the judgment n.o.v. to have been improvidently
granted, it will also consider the propriety of the grant of a new
trial. If a new trial should not have been granted-and this is more
likely when the grant is founded on insufficiency of evidence-the
court of appeals may reverse
the district court's grant and rein56
state the initial verdict.

V.

CONCLUSION

The grant of a new trial by a federal district court, as a general rule, is not immediately reviewable by an appellate court.
There are a number of limited exceptions to this rule over which
the Supreme Court has kept a relatively tight reign. When review
is postponed, the grant of the new trial is likely to be deemed to
have been within the discretion of the trial judge and is frequently
R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1).
5 See id.
" See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 689 (11th Cir. 1985) (grant of
motion for new trial reversed when court of appeals found sufficient evidence); Spurlin v.
General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 621 (5th Cir. 1976) (grant of a new trial reversed when
jury verdict not against great weight of evidence); Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 91
(3d Cir.) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
"FED.
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overshadowed by the second trial. Thus, parties may be better
served by attempting to characterize their situation as falling
within one of the exceptions warranting immediate review. Additionally, in the event the grant of a new trial is based on insufficiency or weight of the evidence, the original verdict winner may
be able to successfully invoke his seventh amendment right not to
have those facts, once tried by a jury, reexamined.

